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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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ALDISERT, Circuit Judge
 
. 
Appellants Matthew Nestor and William Moyer appeal 
from final judgments entered by the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania after a jury 
found Nestor guilty on Count Two of the indictment and 
Moyer guilty on Count Five. Count Two of the indictment 
charged Nestor with knowingly falsifying police reports with 
the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation 
into a matter within the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519. Count 
Five charged Moyer with knowingly making a false material 
statement in a matter within the FBI’s jurisdiction, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  
 
Nestor now challenges both the indictment and his 
conviction. First, he contends that the District Court: (1) 
exceeded its discretion by denying, in relevant part, his 
motion for a bill of particulars; (2) erred by refusing to 
dismiss Count Two because it was duplicitous; and (3) 
exceeded its discretion by refusing to enforce the bill of 
particulars it did order. Nestor also contends (4) that the 
government presented insufficient evidence to support his 
conviction; and (5) that 18 U.S.C. § 1519 is 
unconstitutionally vague. Moyer argues that the evidence was 
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insufficient to support his conviction under § 1001. For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
A. 
 In the late evening of July 12, 2008, in Shenandoah, 
Pennsylvania, teenagers Brandon Piekarsky, Derrick 
Donchak, Brian Scully, Colin Walsh, Ben Lawson, and Josh 
Redmond encountered Luis Ramirez, a Hispanic man, in a 
local park. After some of the teenagers shouted racially 
derogatory comments at Ramirez and told him to “go back to 
Mexico,” a violent fight ensued. App. 00765. Walsh knocked 
Ramirez down and Piekarsky kicked their victim in the head 
while he was on the ground. The fight ended with Ramirez 
lying unconscious in the street. 
 
 Arielle Garcia witnessed part of the incident. She 
recognized the teenagers as students from Shenandoah High 
School and heard Scully shouting “racial” things to Ramirez 
about his ancestry. App. 00767. She saw Scully and Ramirez 
“interlock” and later saw “some[one]” kick Ramirez in the 
head “really hard” after he fell. App. 00675. After the 
teenagers fled the scene toward the park, Garcia phoned 911. 
 
 At the same time, Francis Ney saw approximately four 
“younger individuals” run in front of his moving car. App. 
00977. He heard a female shouting and saw Ramirez lying in 
the street. Ney called 911 and reported seeing the teenagers in 
the park. Ney tried to revive Ramirez but eventually ran to the 
park with a man referred to as “Mexican Jesse,” who 
confronted Piekarsky, Scully, Donchak, Walsh, Lawson and 
Redmond. According to some, “Mexican Jesse” brandished a 
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gun.1
 
 Officer Robert Senape of the West Mahanoy Police 
Department arrived at the scene and requested an ambulance. 
Lieutenant William Moyer and Officer Jason Hayes of the 
Shenandoah Police Department—both defendants below—
arrived shortly thereafter. In the meantime, the police 
dispatch system reported a man chasing people in the park, so 
Lieutenant Moyer and Officer Hayes left to respond.  
 Moments later, Ney again called 911 to report that the 
teenagers who had beaten Ramirez were near the baseball 
field and urged the dispatcher to send police to the area. Ney 
was speaking with the dispatcher when Lieutenant Moyer and 
Officer Hayes arrived. While still on the phone with the 911 
dispatcher, Ney told the officers that approximately five 
teenagers were running through the field on the back side of 
the school. When one of the officers asked who the teenagers 
were, Ney responded that they were a bunch of 16- to 
17-year-old kids. Ney told the officers that he saw the 
teenagers who were beating Ramirez and that they fled when 
he stopped them to ask what they were doing. Ney told the 
police that Donchak remained in the park while the others ran 
away. Throughout this conversation—which was recorded on 
the 911 call—the dispatcher repeatedly asked if Ney was 
speaking with the police. After the dispatcher’s third inquiry, 
                                              
1 One of the teenagers testified that he never saw a weapon. 
Ney acknowledged at trial that Jesse could have had a 
weapon, but explained that he did not remember Jesse having 
a gun. The recordings of Ney’s 911 calls, played to the jury 
and admitted into evidence, do not reference a gun. Ney, 
however, included in his police statement that Jesse had a gun 
and testified before the grand jury that Jesse had a gun that 
evening. 
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Ney responded in the affirmative and the dispatcher 
terminated the call. 
 
 Ney and Donchak were placed in the police cruiser, 
and Lieutenant Moyer drove to Donchak’s home, where the 
teenagers had gathered. After speaking with them, the officers 
looked “shocked” and “confused,” and released the pair from 
the police car. App. 00989. But moments later, when 
Lieutenant Moyer and Officer Hayes saw Ney on their way 
back to the scene, they arrested him based on Piekarsky’s 
assertion that Ney had a gun. Officer Charles Kovalewski of 
the Mahanoy City Police Department arrived while 
Lieutenant Moyer was handcuffing Ney, who kept saying “it 
wasn’t him.” App. 00957. Lieutenant Moyer told Ney to 
“shut up” and placed him in the rear seat of the police car. 
App. 00958. Officer Kovalewski also got into the car. At no 
point did Kovalewski hear Ney say anything about a man 
with a gun. The officers then drove back to the scene of the 
assault. Once there, Officer Hayes—who was romantically 
involved with Piekarsky’s mother, Tammy—took Piekarsky 
toward the park and spoke with him privately.   
 
Lieutenant Moyer telephoned Matthew Nestor, the 
Chief of Police, who was off-duty at a bar, and briefed him on 
the incident. Chief Nestor then called Piekarsky’s mother.2
                                              
2 Meanwhile, at Donchak’s home, the teenagers spoke with 
Piekarsky on the phone and were told that Piekarsky had 
 
Other officers remained at the park and eventually found a 
BB gun. At the police station, Garcia and Ney provided 
statements, during which Garcia never identified who kicked 
Ramirez in the head. Officer Hayes interviewed Ney about 
the gun but did not ask what Ney knew about the assault.  
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The next day, July 13, 2008, detectives from the 
District Attorney’s office arrived at the station. They, along 
with Lieutenant Moyer, interviewed Scully, who relayed “the 
cover story [the teenagers] made up” the night before. App. 
00774. Later that day, District Attorney (“D.A.”) James 
Goodman was briefed about the assault, and he instructed his 
detectives to continue to assist the police with their 
investigation.  
 
Ramirez died on July 14. The cause of death was ruled 
a homicide. Phone records indicate that on the afternoon of 
July 15—immediately after learning the cause of death—
Chief Nestor placed six telephone calls to Tammy Piekarsky.  
 
By July 21, D.A. Goodman decided to take over the 
investigation because (1) the romantic relationship between 
Tammy Piekarsky and Officer Hayes created a conflict of 
interest, and (2) some of the suspects were “trying to protect 
the kicker.” App. 01365. On July 23, D.A. Goodman 
                                                                                                     
given a statement to the police and the other teenagers needed 
to match their stories to Piekarsky’s. Piekarsky and his 
mother came to Donchak’s home later that evening. Based on 
the information Tammy Piekarsky received from Chief 
Nestor, which she relayed to the teenagers, everyone knew 
the situation was serious and that they would get in trouble if 
they did not “get it together and leave things out” of their 
story. App. 00773. The teenagers decided to base their stories 
on Piekarsky’s statement to the police: the fight was “one on 
one” and did not involve “drinking,” “kicking,” or “racial 
language.” App. 00560. 
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contacted the Pennsylvania State Police and the State 
Attorney General’s Office about a possible cover-up 
involving the Shenandoah Police Department.3
 
 Two days 
later, on July 25, the D.A.’s office filed criminal complaints 
against the teenagers.  
On July 28, the D.A.’s office contacted Chief Nestor 
because D.A. Goodman had not yet received any 
investigative reports from Officer Hayes. In fact, the only 
reports D.A. Goodman received from the police department 
were (1) a July 20 report from Chief Nestor regarding his 
investigative steps in the Ramirez assault, and (2) a one-page 
report from Lieutenant Moyer about “an individual who 
brought a BB gun to the scene after the assault” on Ramirez, 
but nothing regarding the assault itself. App. 01367. Chief 
Nestor’s July 20 report did not: (1) identify the teenaged 
suspects; (2) include any of his contacts with Ms. Piekarsky; 
or (3) include his conversation with Borough Manager 
Palubinsky about the conflict of interest.  
 
On August 1, D.A. Goodman sent a formal 
memorandum to Chief Nestor, Lieutenant Moyer and Officer 
Hayes, requesting additional information from Nestor and 
reports from Moyer and Hayes on their involvement in the 
investigation. They complied with this request. Lieutenant 
Moyer’s report indicated that eyewitness Garcia told him at 
                                              
3 That night, Lieutenant Moyer came to the Scully home. He 
parked down the street and told Scully’s stepfather that he 
could not risk being seen. He then said numerous witnesses 
claimed Scully kicked Ramirez and urged them to “[d]o the 
right thing” and get Scully “to confess.” App. 01296. 
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the scene that Scully had kicked Ramirez in the head. Officer 
Hayes’s report—which Chief Nestor reviewed and 
incorporated into his August 1 report—also indicated that 
Garcia identified Scully as the kicker. This was the first time 
the D.A.’s office heard from the Shenandoah Police 
Department that someone had identified Scully as the kicker, 
even though Lieutenant Moyer briefed the D.A.’s office about 
the incident on the morning of July 13. In his August 1 report, 
Nestor stated that he was the one who: (1) contacted the 
D.A.’s office about a possible conflict of interest, and (2) 
requested that the D.A.’s office take over the case.4
 
 
The FBI became involved by the end of July 2008, 
after media reports revealed that the assault may have been 
racially motivated. As part of the investigation, FBI Special 
Agent Adam Aichele interviewed Lieutenant Moyer on June 
2, 2009. At that time, Lieutenant Moyer stated that when he 
initially encountered Ney in the park on the night of the 
assault, Ney said someone had a gun, and, upon hearing this 
information, Moyer instructed Ney to get into the police car. 
Lieutenant Moyer also stated that Ney never identified 
Ramirez’s assailants. When Special Agent Aichele 
interviewed Lieutenant Moyer again on June 11, 2009, Moyer 
reiterated the same sequence of events. Special Agent Aichele 
questioned Moyer’s account and played the 911 recording for 
Moyer, in which Ney does not mention a man with a gun but 
                                              
4 At trial, D.A. Goodman testified that Chief Nestor never 
suggested that the D.A.’s office take over and that it was 
Goodman who contacted Chief Nestor to inform him that the 
D.A.’s office would be “taking over” the case because of the 
conflicts of interest and the D.A.’s suspicion that the police 
department was involved in a cover-up. App. 01365. 
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does identify Ramirez’s assailants. After hearing the 
recording, Lieutenant Moyer said, “That’s not what he told 
me.” App. 01674. Special Agent Aichele played the recording 
several more times for Moyer, who denied that Ney was 
speaking to him when Ney stated in the 911 call, “There they 
go,” claiming that Ney must have been speaking to the 
dispatcher. Lieutenant Moyer then changed his story, stating 
that Ney must have told him about the gun after he put Ney in 
the police cruiser. 
 
B. 
 On December 10, 2009, a federal grand jury returned a 
five-count indictment against Chief Nestor, Lieutenant Moyer 
and Officer Hayes, charging each with conspiring to falsify 
documents with the intent to obstruct an investigation of a 
matter within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United 
States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count One), and with 
the substantive offense of falsifying documents in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Count Two). The indictment additionally 
charged Lieutenant Moyer with two counts of obstruction of 
justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (Counts Three and 
Four) and one count of making false statements in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Count Five). 
 
Chief Nestor moved to dismiss Counts One and Two 
of the indictment and also moved for a bill of particulars 
seeking (1) the agency and matter within the federal 
government’s jurisdiction and (2) the reports and/or 
statements alleged to be false in Count Two. The District 
Court denied the motion to dismiss and granted Chief 
Nestor’s motion for a bill of particulars with respect to the 
“federal investigation or matter under the jurisdiction of a 
United States agency [Nestor] is alleged to have contemplated 
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at the time of the alleged obstructive acts.” App. 00287. In 
response, the government informed Chief Nestor that the 
matter within the FBI’s jurisdiction was the racially 
motivated killing of Ramirez. The Court denied Chief 
Nestor’s motion with respect to reports and/or statements 
pertaining to Count Two, concluding that the indictment 
specifically identified the reports at issue, the investigation to 
which they pertained, their subject matter, authors, and 
relevant dates. 
 
 Defendants pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial. 
At the close of the government’s case-in-chief, defendants 
moved for judgments of acquittal on sufficiency grounds. The 
Court denied the motions. On January 27, 2011, after a 
two-week trial, the jury convicted Moyer of making false 
statements (Count Five) and Nestor of falsifying documents 
(Count Two). Defendants were acquitted on all other counts. 
After the verdict, the Court denied defendants’ motions for 
judgments of acquittal and new trials. Lieutenant Moyer was 
sentenced to three months’ imprisonment on Count Five, 
followed by one year of supervised release; Chief Nestor was 
sentenced to thirteen months’ imprisonment on Count Two, 
followed by two years of supervised release. Defendants 
timely appealed.5
 
 
II. 
 We first consider Nestor’s substantive challenges to 
Count Two of the indictment. He contends that the District 
Court (1) exceeded its discretion by denying the requested bill 
                                              
5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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of particulars relating to the alleged false statements; (2) erred 
by refusing to dismiss Count Two because it was duplicitous; 
and (3) exceeded its discretion by failing to enforce the bill of 
particulars it did order. We address each of these contentions 
in turn. 
 
A. 
First, Nestor contends that the District Court exceeded 
its discretion by denying the requested bill of particulars 
relating to the alleged false statements. The sufficiency of an 
indictment is a question of law over which we exercise 
plenary review. See United States v. Hodge, 211 F.3d 74, 76 
(3d Cir. 2000). A district court’s denial of a motion for a bill 
of particulars is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See 
United States v. Urban
 
, 404 F.3d 754, 771 (3d Cir. 2005). 
For an indictment to be sufficient, it must contain all 
the elements of a crime and adequately apprise the defendant 
of what he must be prepared to meet. See Russell v. United 
States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-766 (1962). “[W]hen the indictment 
itself is too vague and indefinite for such purposes,” a bill of 
particulars is warranted. United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 
49, 64 (3d Cir. 1971) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). “The purpose of the bill of particulars is to inform 
the defendant of the nature of the charges brought against him 
to adequately prepare his defense, to avoid surprise during the 
trial and to protect him against a second prosecution for an 
inadequately described offense.” Id. at 63-64 (quoting United 
States v. Tucker, 262 F. Supp. 305, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)). 
The decision to grant a motion for a bill of particulars is a 
“discretionary matter with the trial court,” and a denial of 
such a motion “does not amount to an abuse of discretion 
unless the deprivation of the information sought leads to the 
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defendant’s inability to adequately prepare his case, to avoid 
surprise at trial, or to avoid the later risk of double jeopardy.” 
Id.
 
 at 64. 
Nestor contends that Count Two of the indictment was 
insufficient because it failed to identify the false statements 
underlying his conviction. See Virgin Islands v. Pemberton
 
, 
813 F.2d 626, 632 (3d Cir. 1987). Nestor asserts he was 
prejudiced by this because, without knowing which 
statements were allegedly false, he was unable to properly 
prepare for trial. Therefore, Nestor contends, the District 
Court exceeded its discretion by denying his motion for a bill 
of particulars.  
We conclude that the indictment here was sufficiently 
detailed such that a bill of particulars was not necessary. 
When an indictment merely quotes the language of a statute 
and that statute contains generalities, the indictment must 
factually define those generalities, descending into 
particulars. See Russell, 369 U.S. at 765. Tracking the 
language of § 1519, Count Two charged Nestor with aiding 
and abetting others in falsifying documents while acting in 
relation to and in contemplation of a matter within federal 
jurisdiction, and doing so with the intent to impede, obstruct, 
and influence an investigation into that matter. The 
indictment, however, did more than just set forth the offense 
in the words of the statute. Count Two explained that the 
falsified documents were “official police reports” created 
between July 12, 2008, and March 30, 2009. App. 00053. 
Because Count Two incorporated Count One (charging 
conspiracy to violate § 1519), Nestor also knew which 
specific police reports were being investigated and which 
14 
 
federal matter was at issue: the racially motivated assault of 
Ramirez.  
 
Although the government did not identify every 
omission or inclusion that rendered false the documents 
identified in the indictment, and thus “did not, at the pre-trial 
stage, weave the information at its command into the warp of 
a fully integrated trial theory for the benefit of the 
defendant[],” the government was not “required to do so.” 
Addonizio
 
, 451 F.2d at 64 (citation omitted). Rule 7(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires an indictment 
to be “concise” and contain “essential facts,” but does not 
require the indictment to include every fact to be alleged by 
the government. Moreover, we agree with the District Court’s 
assessment that the specificity with which the government 
identified the reports at issue made it “highly unlikely that 
[Nestor would] be unfairly surprised with an unfamiliar 
police report at trial.” App. 00288. Because the indictment 
here was sufficiently detailed, we conclude that the District 
Court did not exceed its discretion by declining Nestor’s 
request for a bill of particulars.  
B. 
Nestor asserts that Count Two of the indictment should 
be dismissed altogether because it alleged multiple false 
statements in multiple police reports in a single count and 
was, therefore, duplicitous. “Duplicity is the joining of two or 
more distinct offenses in a single count, so that a general 
verdict does not reveal exactly which crimes the jury found 
the defendant had committed.” United States v. Gomberg, 
715 F.2d 843, 845 (3d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted), overruled 
on other grounds by Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 
(1985). Whether an indictment is duplicitous is a question of 
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law subject to de novo review. See United States v. Haddy
 
, 
134 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 1998).  
Our analysis begins by ascertaining “the allowable unit 
of prosecution to decide whether the indictment properly 
charges a violation of the pertinent statute.” United States v. 
Root, 585 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). To 
do so, we discern “[c]ongressional intent by examining the 
language of the statute.” Id.
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, 
conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false 
entry in any record, document, or tangible 
object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or 
influence the investigation or proper 
administration of any matter within the 
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the 
United States or any case filed under title 11, or 
in relation to or contemplation of any such 
matter or case, shall be fined under this title, 
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. 
 (citation omitted). The statute 
states: 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1519. The statute is silent as to whether each 
falsified document—or even each falsified statement—is 
required to be charged separately or whether multiple 
statements or documents may be combined in one count.  
 
The question of whether each falsified entry in a single 
document must be charged separately was recently considered 
in United States v. Schmeltz, --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 6351623 
(6th Cir. 2011), in which the government charged a defendant 
with one count of obstruction for multiple falsified entries in 
a single document. The court held that “[t]he ‘falsifies’ clause 
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of § 1519 was . . . intended to punish the falsification of a 
document, rather than specific statements or omissions within 
a document. Accordingly, [the defendant] could violate 
§ 1519 once—and no more than once—by falsifying [a 
single] . . . report with his omissions.” Id.
 
 at *4. We agree 
with the rationale of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit and conclude that the statute does not require the 
government to charge separate counts for each false entry in a 
document. 
Section 1519 does not explain in ipsis verbis whether 
each falsified document must be charged separately. The 
statute criminalizes the falsifying of “any record.” The word 
“any” is defined as “[a]n indeterminate derivative of one . . . 
in which the idea of unity . . . is subordinated to that of 
indifference as to the particular one or ones that may be 
selected.” Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2009) (online 
version Dec. 2011). Courts have consistently rejected 
duplicity arguments when the statute employs “any” as a 
signifier regarding the “allowable unit of prosecution.” See 
e.g., Root, 585 F.3d at 150-151 (explaining that multiple 
years of tax evasion may be combined in one count for 
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, which criminalizes any willful 
“attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed 
by this title . . . .” (emphases added)); United States v. 
Brimberry, 744 F.2d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 1984) (“We find that 
these separate actions of the defendant were in furtherance of 
the sole object of destroying all Stix records in Miller’s 
possession, and . . . these actions constituted a continuing 
course of conduct.”); United States v. Berardi, 675 F.2d 894, 
898 (7th Cir. 1982) (concluding that an indictment may 
combine three separate attempts to influence a witness’s 
testimony into one count of obstructing justice by “threats or 
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force, or by any threatening letter” in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1503).  
 
Interpretation of the word “record” permits this 
reading as well. “Record” is defined as “anything preserving 
information and constituting a piece of evidence about past 
events.” Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2009) (online 
version Dec. 2011). Thus, the “record” concerning the 
investigation into the Ramirez assault could fairly be 
interpreted as the collection of official police reports. Because 
Count Two alleges a continuing course, between July 12, 
2008, and March 30, 2009, of falsifying the “record” to 
obstruct a single federal investigation—and identifies 
multiple reports that were created to that singular end—the 
indictment is not duplicitous. See Berardi, 744 F.2d at 898 
(holding that an indictment is not duplicitous when it is 
“fairly interpreted” to set forth a “continuing course of 
conduct, during a discrete period of time” to obstruct justice 
with facts that support such a theory); see also
 
 Rule 7(c)(1) 
(allowing a single count to allege “that the defendant 
committed [the offense] by one or more specified means”). 
But our inquiry is not yet finished. Because the 
government has discretion to draw “[t]he line between 
multiple offenses and multiple means to the commission of a 
single continuing offense,” Berardi, 675 F.2d at 898, we must 
also “examine the concerns traditionally associated with 
charging in one count what could be several independent 
charges.” Root, 585 F.3d at 154 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). These concerns include: (1) avoiding doubt 
that a general verdict may mask a finding of guilt as to one 
crime but not another; (2) avoiding risk that the jury was not 
unanimous as to any one of the crimes charged; (3) providing 
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the defendant adequate notice; (4) supplying an adequate 
basis for sentencing; and (5) protecting against double 
jeopardy. See id.
 
 (citation omitted). 
Nestor argues that Count Two’s duplicity prejudiced 
him because the jurors may have relied on different acts in 
concluding that he was guilty of obstructing justice. We 
disagree. Nestor was convicted of knowingly falsifying the 
record with the intent to obstruct a matter within the 
jurisdiction of the FBI. The jury instructions were crystal 
clear that if the jury found Nestor “guilty of an offense[,] 
every [juror] must agree that the government has overcome 
the presumption of innocence with evidence that proves each 
element of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” App. 
02626. At trial, following the reading of the verdict, the jury 
was polled and the verdict was affirmed individually by each 
juror. Thus, every juror agreed that between July 12, 2008, 
and March 30, 2009, Nestor engaged in a continuing course 
of conduct of using the official police reports to knowingly 
falsify the record of the Ramirez investigation, with the intent 
to obstruct a matter within the jurisdiction of the FBI. Given 
this, we conclude that Count Two of the indictment “may 
fairly be read to charge but a single scheme and is therefore 
not duplicitous.” Root, 585 F.3d at 150 (quoting United States 
v. Shorter
 
, 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
C. 
Nestor contends also that the District Court exceeded 
its discretion in refusing to enforce the bill of particulars that 
it did order.6
                                              
6 The District Court’s order stated: “The government is 
directed to disclose what matter within the jurisdiction of an 
 In response to the Court’s order, the government 
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informed Nestor that “the matter within the jurisdiction of the 
[FBI was] the racially motivated killing of” Ramirez. App. 
00302. Nestor asserts that this response was inadequate and 
required further enforcement. We disagree.  
 
First, the FBI clearly has jurisdiction to investigate 
racially motivated killings under several statutes, including 18 
U.S.C. § 241, § 245, and 42 U.S.C. § 3631. Second, that the 
government did not identify a specific criminal statute over 
which it had jurisdiction is of no consequence. The plain 
language of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 criminalizes a defendant’s 
efforts to obstruct “the investigation or proper administration 
of any matter” within the jurisdiction of the FBI, “or in 
relation to or contemplation of any such matter.” Indeed, 
§ 1519 covers efforts to obstruct investigations that do not 
result in the filing of charges. See, e.g., United States v. Gray
 
, 
642 F.3d 371, 379 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[Section] 1519 does not 
require the existence or likelihood of a federal 
investigation.”). Thus, if the statute does not require the 
existence of a federal investigation before criminal liability 
may attach, it certainly does not require the government to 
identify a specific federal statute that is the focus of the 
investigation. Therefore, because the FBI unquestionably has 
jurisdiction to investigate racially motivated killings, and 
because Nestor was informed that the racially motivated 
killing of Ramirez was the federal matter at issue in Count 
Two, the District Court did not exceed its discretion by 
denying a request for additional information. We therefore 
reject Nestor’s three challenges to the indictment. 
                                                                                                     
agency of the United States Defendant is alleged to have 
contemplated.” App. 00290. 
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III. 
Nestor raises several challenges to the sufficiency of 
evidence to support his conviction on Count Two for 
obstructing justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519. For the 
reasons that follow, we conclude that these contentions do not 
carry the day. 
 
Count Two of the indictment charged Nestor with 
knowingly falsifying police reports with the intent to impede, 
obstruct, or influence the investigation into the racially 
motivated assault of Ramirez. Nestor contends that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt on Count Two. 
Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law, subject to 
plenary review. See United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 
1002 (3d Cir. 2008). We review “the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Government,” afford “deference to a 
jury’s findings,” and draw “all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the jury verdict.” United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 329 
(3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
We will overturn the verdict “only when the record contains 
no evidence, regardless of how it is weighted, from which the 
jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
 
 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Nestor asserts that the evidence was insufficient to 
convict him because the government failed to prove: (1) that 
he knowingly falsified documents; (2) that he knew the 
“matter” at issue was within the FBI’s jurisdiction; (3) that he 
intended to obstruct an FBI investigation; and (4) that he 
acted in “contemplation of” such a matter. To resolve these 
challenges, we must first consider what proof is required to 
establish a violation of § 1519. 
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A. 
The parties agree that the government must prove that 
Nestor knowingly falsified a record or document. The 
government presented evidence from which a reasonable 
juror could conclude not only that Nestor had a motive to 
falsify police reports,7
                                              
7 Evidence presented to support Nestor’s motive includes 
testimony that: (1) he was briefed after the assault that the 
suspects were local teenagers, including Piekarksy; (2) his 
subordinate, Officer Hayes, was dating Piekarsky’s mother; 
(3) he was friends with, and had vacationed with, Officer 
Hayes and Ms. Piekarksy; (4) he spoke with Ms. Piekarsky on 
the night of the assault, after which she instructed the 
teenagers to get their stories straight before talking with the 
police (a story which omitted the final kick to Ramirez and 
the use of racial slurs); and (5) he called Ms. Piekarsky 
immediately after learning that Ramirez’s death was ruled a 
homicide.  
 but that he did, in fact, knowingly 
falsify reports and aided and abetted others in doing so as 
well. The jury learned that on August 1, 2008, as part of the 
D.A.’s investigation into a possible police cover-up of the 
Ramirez assault, the D.A. formally directed Nestor, Moyer 
and Hayes to prepare reports of their investigative efforts. 
The jury learned that Hayes’s report—which Nestor reviewed 
and incorporated into his own report—falsely indicated that 
eyewitness Garcia identified Scully as the one who kicked the 
victim in the head. The jury also heard evidence from which 
it could reasonably infer that Nestor—who was present at 
Garcia’s interview—knew the information in the report about 
Garcia identifying the kicker was false. App. 01997. 
Moreover, none of the police reports included any mention of 
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racial motivation for the assault. Nestor’s own July 20 report 
did not: (1) identify the teenaged suspects then known to him; 
(2) include any of his contacts with Ms. Piekarsky; or (3) 
include his conversation with Palubinsky about the conflict of 
interest. Nestor’s August 1 report, moreover, falsely stated 
that he was the person who (1) contacted the D.A.’s office 
about a possible conflict of interest; and (2) requested that the 
D.A.’s office take over the case. In these respects, the reverse 
was true. 
 
Nestor contends that, like other obstruction of justice 
statutes, § 1519 does not criminalize the omissions in his 
report because there is no proof that he had a 
contemporaneous duty to disclose the specific information 
alleged to have been omitted. See United States v. Curran
 
, 20 
F.3d 560, 566 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]o convict under a section 
1001 concealment charge, the government must show that a 
defendant had a legal duty to disclose the facts at the time he 
was alleged to have concealed them.”). Furthermore, Nestor 
contends, none of the omissions or false representations may 
be considered material.  
These arguments fail. It borders on the ridiculous to 
assert that a Chief of Police would not have a duty to disclose 
the identity of suspects in his official police reports or, 
conversely, that withholding the names of suspects—known 
to him—in those official police reports would be deemed 
acceptable. Furthermore, although one court has concluded 
that material omissions may support a conviction under 
§ 1519, see United States v. Lanham, 617 F.3d 873, 887 (6th 
Cir. 2010), we refuse to require such a conclusion, because 
materiality is not an express element of § 1519, as it is in 18 
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U.S.C. § 1001. Nestor’s reliance on Curran, therefore, is 
misplaced, because that case involved § 1001.8
 
  
From all of this evidence, we conclude that a 
reasonable juror could find that Nestor knowingly falsified 
documents. There was sufficient evidence to prove that he 
knowingly (1) endorsed false information contained in his 
subordinate’s report, (2) omitted information from his own 
report, and (3) produced false information in his report, all 
with the intent to impede the investigation into the racially 
motivated assault. 
 
                                              
8 Regardless, Nestor’s omissions were material. His report 
omitted the names of the suspects involved in the assault, and 
this information would certainly “be of a type capable of 
influencing” the investigation. United States v. McBane, 433 
F.3d 344, 351 (3d Cir. 2005). He also omitted his 
communications with a suspect’s mother and his personal 
relationship with her, which suggests an effort to conceal his 
preferential treatment of that suspect. See United States v. 
Lanham, 617 F.3d 873, 887 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a 
“reasonable fact-finder could conclude that [a defendant] 
falsified his report” in violation of § 1519 when he omitted 
information “as an attempt to ‘cover up’” information). 
Nestor’s affirmative misrepresentations regarding his 
conversations with the D.A. were also material, because if he 
had truthfully reported that it was the D.A. who insisted on 
taking over the investigation, this information would given 
weight to the conflicts of interest and raised questions about 
the police department’s actions during the investigation. 
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B. 
Nestor maintains that the knowledge requirement of 
§ 1519 necessitates that the government prove Nestor knew 
the “matter” at issue was within the jurisdiction of the FBI. 
We decline to read such a requirement into the statute. See 
Bates v. United States
 
, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997) (“[W]e 
ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that 
do not appear on its face.”). 
The most natural reading of § 1519, which we accept, 
is to interpret “knowingly” as modifying its surrounding 
verbs only: “alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, 
falsifies, or makes a false entry.” 18 U.S.C. § 1519; see also 
United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 714 (8th Cir. 2011). 
Although the Supreme Court has occasionally interpreted 
“knowingly” more broadly when scienter is not otherwise 
expressed in the criminal statute, see, e.g., United States v. 
X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69-70 (1994), that 
“concern[] [is] not present here,” because § 1519 expressly 
“requires proof that an accused knowingly falsified a 
document, with intent to impede, obstruct, or interfere with 
the investigation or proper administration of a matter,” 
Yielding, 657 F.3d at 714. “By the plain terms of § 1519, 
knowledge of a pending federal investigation or proceeding is 
not an element of the obstruction crime.” Gray
 
, 642 F.3d at 
378. 
Indeed, “[i]t is well settled that mens rea requirements 
typically do not extend to the jurisdictional elements of a 
crime—that ‘the existence of the fact that confers federal 
jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at the 
time he perpetrates the act made criminal by the federal 
statute.’” United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 664 (4th Cir. 
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2007) (quoting United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 677 n.9 
(1975)). The government therefore need not prove that Nestor 
actually knew that the “matter” at issue was within the 
jurisdiction of the federal government when he falsified 
documents.9
 
 It need only prove that he knowingly falsified 
them. To that end, we conclude that there was sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable juror to find that he did so. 
C. 
 Nestor contends also that the government did not 
prove a sufficient “nexus” between his conduct and the 
federal investigation, as required by United States v. Aguilar, 
515 U.S. 593 (1995), and Arthur Andersen LLP v. United 
States
 
, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). We conclude that proof of such a 
nexus is not required. The text of § 1519 requires only proof 
that Nestor knowingly falsified documents and did so with the 
intent to “impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or 
proper administration of any matter” that happens to be 
within federal jurisdiction. 
                                              
9 Although it was not required to do so, the government did 
present sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that 
Nestor knew the matter at issue was within the FBI’s 
jurisdiction. Witnesses testified that it was widely reported by 
the local media outlets that the FBI became involved in the 
investigation by the end of July—before Nestor wrote both 
police reports. App. 0118-01120. In addition, the government 
presented evidence that every certified police officer in 
Pennsylvania is taught that the FBI has jurisdiction over civil 
rights violations, such as ethnic intimidation and bias crimes, 
and that hate crimes are covered by a variety of federal 
statutes. App. 01572-01574, 01577-01580, 01607-01610. 
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 In reliance upon Aguilar and Arthur Andersen, Nestor 
argues that the government must prove that he intended to 
impede a specific federal investigation. In Aguilar, the Court 
held that the defendant’s act of lying to investigators was not 
sufficiently connected to a grand jury proceeding to uphold 
his conviction under the general obstruction statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1503. See 515 U.S. at 600-601. Extending the reasoning of 
Aguilar to § 1512(b)(2), the Court in Arthur Andersen
 
 held 
that the government was required to prove a “nexus” between 
the defendant’s attempts to persuade another to destroy 
documents and a pending or foreseeable official proceeding. 
544 U.S. at 708 (reasoning that a knowingly corrupt 
persuader “cannot be someone who persuades others to shred 
documents under a document retention policy when he does 
not have in contemplation any particular official proceeding 
in which those documents might be material”). 
We decline to extend the reasoning of §§ 1503 and 
1512(b)(2), because “the language of § 1519 is materially 
different from [those] statutes.” Yielding, 657 F.3d at 712; 
see also United States v. Kernell, --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 
255765, at *6-*7 (6th Cir. 2012). Section 1503 forbids 
“corruptly endeavor[ing]” to obstruct justice, and 
§ 1512(b)(2) prohibits the “knowingly corrupt[t] 
persua[sion]” to obstruct justice. Thus, in both Aguilar and 
Arthur Andersen, the Court was “required to discern the 
substance of an intent requirement from statutory terms that 
appeared to imply one, but did not speak directly to its 
content.” Yielding, 657 F.3d at 713. By contrast, the statute at 
issue here speaks “more directly to the requisite intent and 
describe[s] its scope more precisely.” Id. “That the accused’s 
intent must be wrongful is evident from the nature of the acts 
prohibited, such as knowing falsification of documents, and 
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the requisite intent to influence, obstruct, or impede an 
investigation.” Id. (citation omitted). Nestor’s argument, 
therefore, conflicts with the plain meaning of the statute. “The 
words of the statute are unambiguous, and thus, ‘judicial 
inquiry is complete.’” Gray, 642 F.3d at 377 (quoting Conn. 
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)). Therefore, 
“[i]t is sufficient that the ‘matter’ [under investigation] is 
within the jurisdiction of a federal agency as a factual 
matter.” Yielding
 
, 657 F.3d at 714 (citation omitted). We 
accept the analysis of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit in this respect. 
The legislative history further confirms this 
interpretation. The Senate considered the intent requirement 
to be independent of the jurisdiction requirement, explaining 
that § 1519 “is meant to apply broadly to any acts to destroy 
or fabricate physical evidence so long as they are done with 
the intent to obstruct, impede or influence the investigation or 
proper administration of any matter, and such matter is within 
the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States.” S. Rep. 
No. 107-146, at 14 (2002) (emphases added). The Senate 
Report goes on to clarify: “[t]his statute is specifically meant 
not to include any technical requirement, which some courts 
have read into other obstruction of justice statutes, to tie the 
obstructive conduct to a pending or imminent proceeding or 
matter.” Id. at 14-15; see also
 
 148 Cong. Rec. S7419 (daily 
ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“The 
fact that a matter is within the jurisdiction of a federal agency 
is intended to be a jurisdictional matter, and not in any way 
linked to the intent of the defendant.”). 
Thus, we conclude that the government was required 
only to prove that (1) Nestor intended to impede an 
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investigation into “any matter” and (2) the matter at issue was 
ultimately proven to be within the federal government’s 
jurisdiction. It was not required to prove that Nestor intended 
to obstruct or impede a specific federal investigation. 
 
D. 
Nestor contends also that no reasonable juror could 
have found that he acted in “contemplation of” a specific 
federal investigation at the time he prepared his reports in 
July and August of 2008. Again, Nestor’s argument is based 
upon a misguided reading of § 1519.  
 
The statute expressly criminalizes the knowing 
falsification of any record “with the intent to impede, 
obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper 
administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of” the 
federal government. 18 U.S.C. § 1519. To ensure that the 
statute is applied “broadly,” criminal liability “also extends to 
acts done in contemplation of such federal matters, so that the 
timing of the act in relation to the beginning of the matter or 
investigation is also not a bar to prosecution.” S. Rep. No. 
107-146, at 13 (2002) (emphasis added); see also Gray, 642 
F.3d at 379 (“[Section] 1519 does not require the existence or 
likelihood of a federal investigation.”). In analyzing the intent 
requirement of § 1519, we examined the statute’s use of “any 
matter” and concluded that a defendant need not intend to 
obstruct or impede a specific federal investigation; the 
government must prove only that (1) a defendant intended to 
impede the investigation of “any matter” and (2) the matter at 
issue was ultimately proven to be within the federal 
government’s jurisdiction. See supra Part III.C. The in 
“contemplation of” clause of § 1519 refers to the same 
“matter.” Thus, the same analysis is required.  
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Looking to the evidence presented at trial, we conclude 
that a reasonable juror could have found that Nestor acted in 
“contemplation of” an investigation into the racially 
motivated assault on Ramirez, which was within the 
jurisdiction of the FBI. The government presented evidence 
that D.A. Goodman took over the investigation because he 
determined that the “coverup was more than just the 
[teenaged] boys.” App. 01455. As part of the D.A.’s 
investigation, Goodman directed Nestor to prepare the police 
reports at issue. Moreover, there was evidence that, by the 
end of July 2008, it was well-reported by local news outlets 
that the FBI was investigating the Ramirez assault. We 
conclude that this evidence was sufficient to prove Nestor 
knowingly falsified documents in “contemplation of” an 
investigation of a “matter,” which was proven to be within the 
jurisdiction of the federal government. 
 
IV. 
Finally, Nestor challenges the constitutionality of 
§ 1519, arguing it is too vague. We apply de novo review to 
this challenge. See United States v. Weatherly, 525 F.3d 265, 
273 (3d Cir. 2008). “It is well established that vagueness 
challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment 
freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the 
case at hand.” United States v. Mazurie
 
, 419 U.S. 544, 550 
(1975) (citation omitted). 
A. 
A statute is unconstitutionally vague only if it “fails to 
provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits” or 
“authorizes . . . arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 
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United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 588 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In criminal 
cases, because “vagueness attacks are based on lack of notice, 
they may be overcome in any specific case where reasonable 
persons would know their conduct puts [them] at risk of 
punishment under the statute.” San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 
961 F.2d 1125, 1136 (3d Cir. 1992) (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Criminal 
statutes, therefore, need only give “‘fair warning’ that certain 
conduct is prohibited” to withstand a constitutional challenge. 
Id. (quoting Colten v. Kentucky
 
, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)). 
The focus of our inquiry is the meaning of the statute 
in light of common understanding and practice. See Robinson 
v. Napolitano, 554 F.3d 358, 365 (3d Cir. 2009). In looking at 
the language of the statute, § 1519 “rather plainly 
criminalizes the conduct of an individual who (1) knowingly 
(2) makes a false entry in a record or document (3) with the 
intent to impede or influence a federal investigation.” United 
States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2008). As a law 
enforcement officer, Nestor cannot credibly argue that the 
statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Any 
person of ordinary intelligence—let alone a chief of police—
would comprehend that this statute prohibits a police officer 
from knowingly writing a false report with the intent to 
impede an ongoing, or future, investigation. See id. (“A 
person of ordinary intelligence would understand a police 
report to be a ‘record’ or ‘document,’ and would also read the 
language ‘any matter within the jurisdiction of [a] department 
. . . of the United States’ to include an FBI investigation.”). 
Nestor’s conduct, therefore, falls plainly within the 
prohibitions of the statute, and as such, the statute’s “plain 
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text” put Nestor “on notice [that] his conduct was unlawful.” 
 
Id. 
Section 1519’s scienter requirement, moreover, 
eliminates any concerns regarding statutory vagueness. 
Scienter requirements in criminal statutes “alleviate 
vagueness concerns” because a mens rea element makes it 
less likely that a defendant will be convicted for an action 
committed by mistake. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 
149 (2007) (citation omitted). Because a defendant will be 
convicted for violating § 1519 “only for an act knowingly 
done with the purpose of doing that which the statute 
prohibits, the accused cannot be said to suffer from lack of 
warning or knowledge that the act which he does is a 
violation of law.” Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 102 
(1945). Here, by the express language of the statute, no 
liability will be imposed for knowingly falsifying documents 
without an “intent to impede, obstruct, or influence a matter.” 
18 U.S.C. § 1519; see also Kernell, 2012 WL 255765, at *5 
(“[T]he construction creates the needed specific intent and 
avoids [defendant’s] concern that ‘the statute would forbid 
innocent conduct.’” (quoting Yielding
 
, 567 F.3d at 711)).  
B. 
Nestor contends also that applying § 1519 to his 
actions would require a Procrustean stretching of that 
statute’s language, because his actions were not done in 
“contemplation of” an FBI investigation. Specifically, Nestor 
asserts that the “contemplation of” clause is too vague 
because it does not specify what a defendant must know to 
trigger criminal liability.  
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We have already concluded that it was enough that the 
government prove that Nestor acted in “contemplation of” an 
investigation into the racially motivated assault on Ramirez, 
which was within the jurisdiction of the FBI. Although this 
interpretation makes criminal liability very broad under 
§ 1519, this “is consistent with the legislative history and 
other cases to consider the question.” Kernell, 2012 WL 
255765, at *8; see also Gray
 
, 642 F.3d at 379 (“[Section] 
1519 does not require the existence or likelihood of a federal 
investigation.”); S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 14 (2002) 
(explaining that § 1519 “is meant to apply broadly to any acts 
to destroy or fabricate physical evidence” (emphasis added)).  
“Moreover, even if this element is potentially vague as 
it relates to hypothetical defendants,” it is clearly not vague as 
it relates to Nestor. Kernell, 2012 WL 255765, at *8. As 
previously discussed, the government presented sufficient 
evidence to prove that when Nestor falsified the police 
reports, he contemplated an investigation into a matter within 
the jurisdiction of the FBI, intending to impede that 
investigation. See supra, Part III.D. Thus, we conclude that 
the statute is not vague “in the light of the facts of the case at 
hand.” Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 550 (citation omitted).10
 
 
                                              
10 Nestor also maintains that § 1519 is void for vagueness as 
applied to his case because the nexus required between his 
conduct and the investigation is too attenuated. This argument 
is foreclosed by our conclusion that the government is not 
required to prove a nexus between Nestor’s conduct and the 
investigation. See supra Part III.C. 
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Because § 1519 clearly expresses the elements that the 
government must prove to secure a conviction under the 
statute, we reject Nestor’s challenges to its constitutionality. 
 
V. 
We now turn to review Moyer’s conviction on Count 
Five, for knowingly making a false material statement in a 
matter within the FBI’s jurisdiction in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001.11
 
 Specifically, the indictment alleged that, in 
conversations with the FBI on June 2 and 11, 2009, Moyer 
falsely stated that (1) an eyewitness warned that there was a 
man with a gun in the park and (2) the same eyewitness never 
identified anyone involved in the assault on Ramirez. 
To establish a violation of § 1001, the government was 
required to prove each of the following five elements: (1) that 
Moyer made a statement or representation; (2) that the 
statement or representation was false; (3) that the false 
statement was made knowingly and willfully; (4) that the 
statement or representation was material; and (5) that the 
statement or representation was made in a matter within the 
                                              
11 Again, sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law, 
subject to plenary review. See Silveus, 542 F.3d at 1002. We 
review “the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Government,” afford “deference to a jury’s findings,” and 
draw “all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict.” 
Riley, 621 F.3d at 329 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). We will overturn the verdict “only when the record 
contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighted, from 
which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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jurisdiction of the federal government.12 See United States v. 
Barr
 
, 963 F.2d 641, 645 (3d Cir. 1992). Moyer contends that 
the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove three of 
the required five elements: (1) that the statements were false; 
(2) that they were made knowingly and willfully; and (3) that 
they were material. For the reasons that follow, we conclude 
that the evidence was sufficient to support Moyer’s 
conviction. 
A. 
First, we agree with the government that there was 
sufficient evidence that Moyer made false statements. Based 
on the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable juror could 
find that Moyer falsely stated that the eyewitness, Francis 
                                              
12 18 U.S.C. § 1001 states: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, 
whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of 
the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of 
the Government of the United States, 
knowingly and willfully— 
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by 
any trick, scheme, or device a material 
fact; 
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, 
or fraudulent statement or representation; 
or 
(3) makes or uses any false writing or 
document knowing the same to contain 
any materially false, fictitious, or 
fraudulent statement or entry; 
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more 
than 5 years . . . . 
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Ney, did not identify Ramirez’s assailants. Indeed, the 911 
call recorded this identification. The recording indicates that, 
after being asked who the teenagers were, Ney told the 
officers that a bunch of 16- to 17-year-old kids, who had 
beaten up Ramirez, began running when Ney asked what they 
were doing. This evidence is more than sufficient to support 
the jury’s finding that Moyer falsely stated to the FBI that 
Ney did not identify the suspects. See United States v. 
McKanry
 
, 628 F.3d 1010, 1018 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding 
defendant’s false statement conviction where defendant’s 
statement was “directly contradicted by [trial] evidence”).  
The jury’s finding that Moyer falsely stated that Ney 
reported seeing a man with a gun is equally well supported. 
There is no mention of a man with a gun whatsoever in the 
911 recording. Moreover, Officer Hayes’s written report 
makes no mention of Ney informing the officers about such a 
man. Ney even testified that immediately after the 911 call 
ended, he got into the police cruiser and did “not remember” 
having a conversation with anyone while in the cruiser. App. 
01027. Furthermore, Moyer confirmed that there were no 
conversations while Ney was in it. Ney also testified that it 
was only after one of the teenagers told police that Ney had a 
gun—and immediately before the police arrested him—that 
he realized the police were even concerned about a man with 
a gun. Thus, the jury could reasonably conclude that Ney 
never actually informed the police—either during the 
recorded 911 call or immediately after—that there was a man 
with a gun. Although Moyer testified that Ney did, in fact, 
mention a man with a gun, it was the jury’s duty—and not 
ours—to “weigh evidence [and] determine the credibility of 
witnesses . . . .” United States v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 140, 151 
(3d Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 
36 
 
421 (3d Cir. 1992)). Based on the 911 recording, Hayes’s 
written report, and Ney’s testimony, the evidence was 
sufficient to support a finding that Moyer’s statements to the 
FBI were false. See McKanry
 
, 628 F.3d at 1018 (holding that 
the “evidence adequately supports the jury’s verdict” when 
defendant’s “denial was directly contradicted by evidence, 
including [defendant’s] recorded admission”). 
B. 
We also agree that there was sufficient evidence that 
Moyer acted “deliberately and with knowledge” that his 
representations were false and that he was aware “at least in a 
general sense, that his conduct was unlawful.” United States 
v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 212 (3d Cir. 2009). When 
questioned on June 2 and June 11, 2009, Moyer told the FBI 
that, immediately upon his arrival at the scene, Ney warned of 
someone in the park with a gun. The jury also heard 
testimony that, when confronted with the 911 recording in 
which Ney did not mention a gun and did identify the 
participants, Moyer changed his original statement so it 
would no longer conflict with the recording. Moyer’s efforts 
to conform his statement to the recording are sufficient to 
support the jury’s finding that Moyer deliberately changed his 
statement and knew that both his original and changed 
statements were false. See id. at 212-213. The government, 
moreover, presented evidence that no gunman was ever 
mentioned, as Ney testified at trial that he had no recollection 
of ever mentioning that anyone had a gun in the park that 
night. Furthermore, the jury also heard sufficient evidence to 
conclude that Moyer knew his actions were unlawful; as a 
certified law enforcement officer, Moyer received training 
that made him aware that, “at least in a general sense,” 
obstructing a criminal investigation by lying to a federal law 
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enforcement officer is unlawful. Id.
 
 at 212. All of this 
evidence was sufficient to prove that Moyer’s actions were 
knowing and willful.  
C. 
Finally, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence 
to support a finding of materiality. Courts have recognized 
that “a frequent aim of false statements made to federal 
investigators is to cast suspicion away from the declarant.” 
United States v. Lutpon, 620 F.3d 790, 806 (7th Cir. 2010). 
“When statements are aimed at misdirecting agents and their 
investigation, even if they miss spectacularly or stand 
absolutely no chance of succeeding, they satisfy the 
materiality requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.” Id.
 
 at 806-807.  
Although the government was not required to show 
actual reliance on Moyer’s statements, it was required to 
prove that Moyer’s statements had a “natural tendency to 
influence” or were “capable of influencing” the FBI. United 
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also McBane, 433 
F.3d at 352 (explaining that false statements that could cause 
the FBI “to re-direct their investigation . . . question their 
informant differently or more fully, or perhaps close their 
investigation altogether” were material). Count Five focused 
on Moyer’s efforts to obstruct the investigation, and 
specifically, his actions to focus attention away from 
Piekarsky. His statements to the FBI that Ney mentioned a 
man with a gun but did not identify Ramirez’s assailants, if 
taken as true, could have explained Moyer’s actions on the 
night of the assault with respect to his protection of the 
teenaged suspects. If believed and acted upon, Moyer’s false 
statements could have refocused the FBI’s investigation. For 
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this reason, Moyer’s statements were material, because they 
were “of a type capable of influencing a reasonable 
decisionmaker.” McBane
 
, 433 F.3d at 351.  
Thus, we conclude that Moyer’s conviction was 
sufficiently supported by evidence that he knowingly and 
willfully made materially false statements to the FBI and we 
will therefore affirm his conviction. 
 
VI. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the 
judgments of the District Court.  
